Huawei's high-level exchange operations are chaotic

On March 27, 2011, Huawei's strength in the terminal business was not small. As an important part of Huawei's cloud management strategy, the influence of the terminal business has dramatically increased within the company. However, behind the gorgeous appearance gradually revealed some problems, the game of the channel strategy to Huawei's terminal into slow growth, and did not even complete the 2011 target, and even more fatal is that frequent executives "exchange" caused its operating ideas have been Chaos state.

As we all know, most of Huawei's mobile phones have been using customized strategies with operators. This is Huawei's advantage, but it is also a disadvantage, resulting in its over-reliance on operators' channels for sales, resulting in a serious shortage of Huawei's own channels and social channels. According to the latest statistics from global technology research and consulting firm Gartner in February this year, Huawei's worldwide terminal shipments reached 40.66 million units in 2011, an increase of nearly 50% year-on-year, and its market share increased from 1.5% in 2010 to 2.3%. The eighth place in the world. It is understood that the performance of the China region has always been higher on the Huawei terminal's global departments, but it has not actually reached the established target.

Earlier, Yang Xiaozhong, president of Huawei Terminal China, said in an exclusive interview with the media that Huawei's mobile phone shipments in the Chinese market will exceed 22 million in 2011, and according to reliable sources, only 16 million or so were actually completed. Among them, the ratio of sales from the operator channels exceeded 60%. For example, the sales volume of smart phones such as C8650, C8500 and China Unicom's customized U8500 customized with China Telecom (micro-blog) exceeded one million, and individual models exceeded 3.5 million. Obviously, the target of 22 million units is far from the actual one. So far, Huawei has not announced the actual shipments in China, and it has also been transferred from Yang Xiaozhong in the previous month.

From the beginning of last year, Huawei also realized that relying solely on operators' channels is far from enough. It attaches great importance to the development of its own and social channels, but the effect is not satisfactory. Huawei’s top management announced last year that by the end of 2011 Huawei’s terminal will build 10 image stores in China and cover 3000-4000 stores and 5000-6000 counters. As of press time, Tencent Technology understands from Huawei's terminal customer service that there are currently only three HUAWEI terminal image stores in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen.

In August last year, the debut of Xiaomi’s mobile phone caused a stir in the industry, which also caused a great impact on traditional mobile phone operators. In September, Huawei released Honor, its flagship smart phone, which was considered by the outside world to be a strong product against Xiaomi’s mobile phone. However, due to the slow time to market and the unbalanced internal high-level channel strategy, the product was finally available in December. This is more than a month later than the regular new product launch cycle, and the operator-customized version is dragged into February this year.

While Xiaomi’s mobile phone has won a lottery through continuous and effective marketing and cost-effective products, the brand’s influence and reputation far exceed Honor at the time. Yu Chengdong, chairman of Huawei Terminal, explained that "capacity is not a problem, and the problem is the channel. The complexity of social channels really makes Huawei terminals unprepared." The social channels are not built, and Huawei's terminal companies have for many years The high level of frequent "exchange of blood" is inseparable, which reflects the tangled thinking of Huawei's terminal operations.

According to statistics, Huawei registered Huawei Terminal Co., Ltd. at the end of 2003 with a registered capital of 760 million yuan. In 2004, the terminal company was established and was led by Xu Zhijun. Guo Ping took over management at the end of 2005. At that time, both internal and external evaluations of Guo Ping were relatively high. He can achieve a good balance whether it is integrating resources or grasping customer needs. The development from 2005 to 2008 laid a good foundation for Huawei's terminal growth.

According to the regulations of the three-year rotation system of Huawei executives, in 2008, Chen Zhaohui took office of Guo Ping. But in 2009 it was replaced by Tao Jingwen. At the end of 2010, Wan Hao was placed in the upper rank. In February of this year, Wan Hao was secretly adjusted from the CEO of the terminal company to COO. At present, the CEO of the terminal company is more often the vice president of Huawei and chairman of the terminal company. Yu Chengdong to play. In this way, Huawei's terminal company has changed its head position for 6 years in 8 years. It is almost a year for Guo Pingwai to change. It is difficult for such frequent executives to “exchange blood” to ensure the unity of their operational ideas.

Looking at recent changes, Yang Xiaozhong, president of Huawei Terminal China, has been removed from China. Huawei's official statement is that Yang Xiaozhong will be responsible for the Huawei terminal's global sales business. The president of China will be replaced by Wang Weijun, former president of Huawei's Southeast Asia region. At the same time, one of the two vice presidents of Huawei Terminal China was relocated. Although Huawei's official explanation of this said that this is an internal normal rotation system. However, according to industry sources, Yang Xiaozhong has been responsible for the sales of customized channels by operators, and he believes that the development of e-commerce channels will affect sales in the operator's customized market, deviating from other high-level strategies of Huawei, and that Huawei will focus on creating a star machine. The severely lagging of the Honor-listed market and the unsatisfactory results mentioned above caused the senior management to make up their minds and only then had this “normal change of personnel”.

In addition to the aforementioned changes, Huawei's terminal CMO Xu Weiquan has also been secretly adjusted to the CSO (CFO). The CMO was replaced by Shao Yang. It was originally the marketing director of Huawei's mobile equipment and was mainly responsible for the system's market and brand in Western Europe. Marketing, as well as Wang Weijun, was once a member of Yu Chengdong.

From the perspective of the current terms of reference and Huawei's terminal activities, Yu Chengdong basically replaced Wan Wan's role in the performance of the CEO. Xu Yuquan was basically overrun and had no real power. Since last year the terminal company's brand department reported to Xu Weiquan, the terminal brand department reports directly to Yu Chengdong.

Under the leadership of Yu Chengdong, Huawei's terminal made a new adjustment to this year's development thinking, that is, diversified key channels, will be inclined to the social channels (the provincial generation of provinces) and e-commerce, but Huawei's internal thinking has not completely transformed. As a result, Huawei's terminal e-commerce platform, which was rushed to go online last week, was flawed. Some models could not be purchased at the same time, and the price of the same product was even 35% higher than that of the traditional e-commerce. The high-level changes are frequent, and the channel thinking is difficult to unify. Yu Chengdong has realized this. The ACSEND P1 pushed by him has been accelerating the launch of rhythm and social channel coverage. After the release of CES in January, it declared that it would be listed in China in April. The speed of the listing cycle is faster than before Huawei's heavyweight products, and his strategy is also being recognized internally and externally. (Editor: Lecea)